- Canada's Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom
- Common menu bar links
- Graeme S. Mount - Wikipedia
On the other hand, soldiers who in the past have been used as spies and which are captured after they have resumed their normal activities must not be punished for their earlier activities of espionage. One must not confuse spies with elements who can be sent on reconnaissance patrol or special forces operations in enemy territory. As we have already seen, units of that type wear uniform and must in no case be treated as spies. In general, persons participating in activities of espionage can be attacked and, if they are captured during these activities, they are not entitled to prisoner-of-war [POW] status.
Members of the armed forces engaging in activities of espionage while not wearing uniform can be treated as spies and lose their right to POW status if they are captured before having rejoined the armed forces to which they belong. If they participate in hostilities, they can be punished for their participation, but only after a fair trial provided with all judicial guarantees. NB: In case of doubt as to the status of persons captured during hostilities, these persons must be treated as POWs until a regularly constituted tribunal has determined their real status.
If the tribunal determines that the captive is a lawful combatant, this captive is entitled to POW status. Saboteurs in uniform are combatants and are entitled to POW status if they are captured. Civilian saboteurs or saboteurs not wearing uniform do not receive that protection and risk being treated as spies. They can be brought to justice in conformity with the laws of the force which has captured them and can incur the death penalty. They can, however, not be punished without a fair trial. If they are captured and detained, the following persons are not entitled to POW status, but they shall nevertheless be treated humanely:.
Canada's Enemies: Spies and Spying in the Peaceable Kingdom
When one cannot determine whether a given prisoner is entitled to be treated as POW, the prisoner is treated as such until his status has been determined by a regularly constituted tribunal …. Nationality has no effect on the right to POW status. That right depends on the country to which the armed forces belong, thus, even if the country of the prisoner is neutral, a national serving with a Party to the conflict becomes a POW if he is captured.
The Occupying Power may impose the death penalty only on inhabitants guilty of espionage, sabotage [and] intentional offences having caused death. However, such offences must have been punishable by death under the law in force in occupied territory before occupation. Spies may be used but they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war status. Spying during armed conflict is not a violation of international law. Captured spies are not, however, entitled to prisoner-of-war status. The captor nation may try and punish spies in accordance with its national law.
Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly territory, liability to punishment terminates.
If subsequently captured during some other military operation, the former spy cannot be tried or punished for the earlier act of espionage. Even if they are members of their armed forces, [spies] do not have the right to the status of prisoner of war. Persons who fall into the hands of the adversary while engaging in espionage shall be liable to punishment. Even if taken while engaging in espionage, a spy shall not be punished without prior conviction pursuant to regular judicial proceedings. Therefore, a state that captures a spy is allowed to bring him to trial in accordance with its own internal laws, an offense that is generally punishable by a long prison sentence or even death … A spy who has succeeded in completing his mission and returning to his army is once again entitled to legal combatant status.
Spying in itself is not an action that is prohibited in itself under the rules of war, and a country sending a spy into enemy territory is not in breach of international law. As has been shown, however, a spy does not meet the conditions required of a legitimate fighter because he is hidden among the civilian population and is consequently not entitled to the immunity from prosecution of a prisoner-of-war. A country that captures a spy is entitled to put him on trial under the domestic laws and sentence him to a long term of imprisonment or even to death if the spy is a national of the country in which he was caught, the crime for which he may be tried may be treason, and not espionage.
The rules of The Hague Convention are also designed to protect the rights of a spy. A spy who has been caught is entitled to a trial, and as stated his punishment will be meted out under the internal laws of the country that caught him. A spy who has succeeded in fulfilling his mission and return to his army is entitled to return to the status of legitimate fighter, and if he becomes a prisoner-of-war as a combatant it is not permitted for him to be tried as a spy.
Spies may be used but they do not have the right to prisoner-of-war treatment. Those captured while engaged in espionage do not have POW [prisoner-of-war] status but may not be punished without trial … Members of the armed forces who were involved in spying cease to be spies as soon as they return to their own lines.
If subsequently captured, they cannot be punished for their previous spying activities. A member of the armed forces who falls into the hands of the adversary while engaged in espionage has no entitlement to the status of prisoner of war; he can be treated as a spy … Military spies, who rejoin their forces after having accomplished their task and are subsequently captured, must be treated as prisoners of war and no longer be convicted for their earlier spying activities … A spy caught in the act may under no circumstances be sentenced without trial. He may be treated as a spy. This therefore constitutes an exception to the rule that a captured combatant has prisoner-of-war status.
If, however, the military spy returned to his own troops after fulfilment of his mission, and is captured later, the enemy must treat him as a prisoner of war. He may no longer be convicted of his previous acts of espionage. International law does not prohibit espionage. A spy is therefore not guilty of infringing the rules of the humanitarian law of war. It also goes without saying that every State makes espionage punishable under its own national legislation.
A captured non-military spy has no right to prisoner-of-war status. This is an exception to the rule that a captured combatant has the status of a prisoner of war. However, if a military spy has returned to his own side on completion of his mission, and is later captured by the enemy, he must be treated as a prisoner of war and may no longer be convicted for his earlier espionage see also … AP I [ Additional Protocol I] Article Although spying is not contrary to the law of armed conflict, international law provides that spies, if captured, may be tried in accordance with the law of the captor and may be liable to the death penalty.
To punish them without a proper trial is, however, a war crime. The collection of information by persons wearing uniform is a permitted means of conflict and a person so engaged is liable to be fired upon as is any other member of the enemy forces. If captured, such a person is to be treated as a prisoner of war.
Persons who have evaded capture when carrying out acts of espionage and who have rejoined their own forces or own national authority cannot be charged with such acts if subsequently captured; if they are members of armed forces they must be treated as prisoners of war. For the purpose of waging war it is necessary to obtain information about the enemy. To get such information, it is lawful to employ spies and use soldiers and civilians of the enemy for committing acts of treason.
But although this practice by the states is considered legitimate, lawful punishment under the municipal law may be imposed upon individuals engaged in espionage or treason when they are caught by the enemy … Soldiers wearing their uniform when penetrating the enemy zone of operations are not spies and if captured, should be treated as prisoners of war.
When a spy is apprehended, he should not be punished without a fair regular trial. A spy who succeeds to rejoin his armed forces and is subsequently captured by the enemy is not liable to be punished for his previous acts of espionage. Such immunity is not accorded to a civilian spy captured by the enemy after reaching his own territory.
Military Regulation , 1 January , Article 4. When fallen into the power of the adversary, neither spies nor mercenaries shall have the right to prisoner-of-war status and shall be subject to punishment for their activities.
However, sentences with respect to the above persons shall only be passed with previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court and the accused shall be provided with the generally recognized guarantees of court defence. Captured spies and mercenaries do not have the status of POW. Spies and mercenaries … do not have the status of a combatant, and therefore not of POW when captured. Additional Protocol I articles 46 and This rule applies while they are being detained as spies or mercenaries. Spies are not lawful combatants and are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status.
Espionage is a criminal offence and captured spies are tried in the criminal justice system of the detaining power, which will first rule on the status of the accused, if there is any doubt about it. The law of armed conflict does not prohibit [espionage] activities, but penalizes them by depriving members of the armed forces captured engaging in espionage of prisoner-of-war status. International law applicable in armed conflict does not prohibit the use of spies and secret agents, who can even be soldiers or civilians of enemy nationality.
Nevertheless, upon their capture or arrest, these persons are liable to be sentenced severely, according to the domestic law of the State concerned … A spy who is caught in the act may not be sentenced without previous judgment. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict who is a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who, on behalf of the Party on which he depends, gathers or attempts to gather information of military value within that territory shall not be considered as engaging in espionage unless he does so through an act of false pretences or deliberately in a clandestine manner.
Moreover, such a resident shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured while engaging in espionage. A member of the armed forces of a Party to the armed conflict who is not a resident of territory occupied by an adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not lose his right to the status of prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed forces to which he belongs. However, their punishment may only be imposed by a competent tribunal.
Common menu bar links
Regular members of the armed forces who are caught as spies are not entitled to be treated as prisoners of war. But they would appear to be entitled, as a minimum, to the limited privileges conferred upon civilian spies or saboteurs by [Article 5 of the Geneva Convention IV].
Those captured while engaged in espionage do not have PW [prisoner-of-war] status but may not be punished without trial. If members of the armed forces gather intelligence in occupied territory they may not be treated as spies provided that they are in uniform. Even if not in uniform, members of the armed forces who were involved in spying cease to be spies as soon as they return to their own lines.
If subsequently captured they cannot be punished for their previous spying activities. A spy may not be punished without first having been tried and convicted. A person who falls into the hands of an adverse party while engaging in espionage, does not have the right to the status of prisoner of war, although it may be given at the discretion of the detaining power.
Even without the status of prisoner of war, a spy may only be subjected to punishment after trial by a court applying the prescribed safeguards. Captured spies remain entitled to the basic humanitarian guarantees provided by Additional Protocol I. In its chapter on the enforcement of the law of armed conflict, the manual further states:. With respect to occupied territories, the manual uses the same wording as Articles 5 of the Geneva Convention IV. Should a spy succeed in eluding capture and return to friendly territory, he is immune from punishment for his past espionage activities.
Any person who uses war instruments or procedures the application of which violates an international agreement entered into by Denmark or the general rules of international law, shall be liable to the same penalty [i. Geneva Conventions Act , , as amended in , Section 4 1 and 4.
Wartime Military Penal Code , , Article Once spies have returned to their own troops and are then arrested, they cannot be punished as spies, but have to be treated as prisoners of war. Any enemy who, in disguise, intrudes into one of the locations listed in the preceding article [area of war, military post or establishment, works, camps, bivouacs or quarters of an army] is punished by death. Military Justice Code , , Article Anyone who contravenes or is accessory to the contravention of provisions relating to the protection of persons or property laid down in … the two additional protocols to [the Geneva] Conventions … is liable to imprisonment.
Any person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be tried by a general court-martial or by a military commission, and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death.
A commander who, except in the case of imminent danger to the security of the armed forces or to the military defence of the State, orders that a person caught in the act of spying … should immediately be brought before a firing squad without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, shall be liable to military confinement for up to one year. Military Criminal Code , , Article Military Criminal Code , , Articles 52 and The accused participated in the summary court which condemned the civilians, suspected of espionage, to death and also took part in their execution.
Ohashi case , Judgment, 23 March I express no view on the matter. It is common cause that the ANC in publicly subscribed to their provisions. The only existing issue in this respect is whether they entitled the ANC, without anything further being done, to detain the appellant as a suspected spy until the cessation of hostilities as the ANC claimed or whether it was obliged to afford him the benefit of a trial within a reasonable period. In this respect the appellant sought to rely upon art 75 of the Protocol while the ANC invoked articles 43 to 46 of the Geneva Conventions.
The argument before us on the point was limited and not supported by authority. The purpose of a trial would have been to establish whether he was a spy, in which case he could, at best for him, have been detained until hostilities had ceased or, failing proof that he was a spy, to oblige his release. On this basis, it found the accused guilty of the killing without trial of a British soldier who was alleged to be a spy. Sandrock case Almelo Trial , Judgment, 24—26 November In the Dostler case before the US Military Commission at Rome in , the accused, the commander of a German army corps, was found guilty of having ordered the shooting of 15 American prisoners of war in violation of the Hague Regulations and of long-established laws and customs of war.
The Defence submitted that the US soldiers had worn no distinctive emblem and that their mission had been undertaken for the purpose of sabotage. The Defence considered, therefore, that they were not entitled to the privileges of a lawful belligerent, though it was admitted that they were entitled to a lawful trial even if they were treated as spies. Dostler case , Judgment, 12 October Specification: In that [the defendant], a person subject to trial by military commission as an alien unlawful enemy combatant, did, in Afghanistan, on or about July 27, , while in the context of and associated with armed conflict and without enjoying combatant immunity, unlawfully and intentionally murder [a] U.
Army Sergeant First Class … , in violation of the law of war, by throwing a hand grenade at U. The Commission stated the following in relation to the lawfulness of the offence of murder being tried by US military commissions:. As if anticipating the defense motion in this case, the Supreme Court actually defined those who are protected by the Law of Nations and those who are not:.
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants … Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy … [is a familiar example of a belligerent who is] generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be … [an offender] against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.
Ex Parte Quirin , Id. The Report on the Practice of Botswana maintains that spies are not protected. Report on the Practice of Botswana, , Chapter 1. The Report on the Practice of Jordan notes that while there is no definition of the concept of spies in domestic law nor any provision concerning their status, interviews with military officers confirmed that spies are put on trial in Jordan.
Report on the Practice of Jordan, , Interviews with military officers, Answers to additional questions on Chapter 1. According to the legal adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, a captured spy who is a member of enemy armed forces cannot be deemed a prisoner of war and may be punished under national law. On the basis of replies by army officers to a questionnaire, the Report on the Practice of Rwanda affirms that spies are not considered as civilians.
The Smallest of Red Dresses. Food Not Bombs Victoria.
Graeme S. Mount - Wikipedia
Pipeline And Red Dresses. A Day in the Life of Palistine. Yves Engler. Tribute for Peter Golden. A Voice From Palestine. Canadian Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions to support Palestine.
- Ballroom: Culture and Costume in Competitive Dance (Dress, Body, Culture).
- Peaceable Kingdom - PDF Free Download.
- The Writing Warrior: Discovering the Courage to Free Your True Voice?
- Igor Gouzenko - Historical Background - A Glimpse Behind the Iron Curtain.
- Graeme S. Mount.
- The Dyno-Mite Dog Show (The Secret Knock Club Book 1).
The Prophetic Legacy of Oscar Romero. Palestine in My Heart. Resistance Renewed: Return to Palestine. The Mazi Mazuri Center in Kenya. Women in struggle in Pakistan. Theresa Wolfwood. Canadian Peace Research Association Conference History of Women in Black. A Tribute to Ann Kemp. A new poetry collection by Theresa Wolfwood. Gerd Weih The Life and Work of Rosalie Bertell. Elizabeth Mayne Gallery. Resistance in Palestine: The Canadian Connection. The World of Hilary Newitt Brown. NO to Female Genital Mutilation! A Woman Named Allessia. World Social Forum. Sustainable Development by Razan Zuayter.
Playing with nukes. Drawing Detention, Creating Connections. The spark which eventually resulted in the Suez crisis was the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egypt from its owner Britain in June Losing control over the canal threatened the strategic interests of the European powers, as the canal provided a fast sea link to Asia and an easy conduit for Middle Eastern oil. Laurent refused to join the British after a call for allied aid. The Americans condemned the actions of the British and the French, thinking invasion would only cause more problems.
Canada initially sent a transport squadron of the Royal Canadian Air Force and administrative personnel, increasing its troop commitment to over by , comprising more than one-sixth of the entire UNEF force. Time for sightseeing Therefore, according to official statements from the Canadian government, Canada was involved in the Suez in the interests of peace, and to protect humanitarian concerns in the area.
However, most historians disagree with the peacekeeping myth as applied to Suez. The British and French invasion of Egypt put a great amount of pressure on NATO and the Commonwealth, two multilateral organizations that Canada considered important to its interests. Firstly, the United States was deeply opposed to the invasion, going so far as to cut off contact with the British and to draft a resolution condemning their actions.
Thus, an excuse had to be found for the British and French to leave the Canal Zone. UNEF was the mechanism by which this was made possible. Primary evidence supports the assertion that Canada was motivated by its interests in keeping together NATO and the Commonwealth. Laurent made no mention of the human tragedy of the invasion, but rather, of three political consequences that troubled him. As was offered previously, Canada deeply valued the NATO alliance in a world threatened by expansionary communism. Chief Petty Officer Dave Greaves is there to see none of the children fall off the mounting.
Secondly, the Canadian operation in Vietnam was not military in nature. Finally, Vietnam was not carried out under UN auspices. As part of the ICSC, Canada acted as a strong representative of the Western power bloc in the context of the global struggle against communism. In , the decolonization struggle in French Indochina paused for a peace conference in Geneva. Provisions were made for the creation of three International Control Commissions, one in each of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, to supervise the truce, and to monitor the free movement of refugees and the release of prisoners of war.
The ICSC had no powers of enforcement; its tasks were to supervise and monitor the truce and the flow of refugees, as well as to look for violations of the Geneva accord. This was initially successful, but the mission soon ran into problems. Restricting the flow of arms into the South and the North soon proved impossible, and by , the ceasefire had disintegrated. Near the end of the conflict, in , Canada, with Indonesia, Hungary, and Poland, joined a new body, the International Commission of Control and Supervision ICCS , which supervised the ceasefire that allowed American troops to withdraw from Vietnam.
With respect to its participation in Vietnam, Canadian actions were influenced and informed by a Cold War context that understood communist expansion as a clear threat to Western interests. During the early Cold War era, Western military doctrine held that the nuclear deterrent and troop build-up in Europe would largely dissuade direct superpower conflict. Consequently, Soviet imperialism would be directed against peripheral targets, primarily in Asia and Africa, where the USSR would attempt to gain a strategic advantage over the West.
Canada, like the United States, sought to prevent the spread of communism into South Vietnam, and Canada hoped to aid the American cause by allowing arms into South Vietnam, acting as a messenger to Hanoi, and spying in North Vietnam. However, certain public statements of Canadian leaders certainly did not present Canadian actions in this context. If, therefore, Canada can assist in establishing such security and stability in South-East Asia, we will be serving our own country, as well as the cause of peace. In February , Paul Martin Sr.
But we do have an interest, as a responsible member of the world community, in helping to ensure that all people in the area are enabled to live under conditions of their own choosing. Canada, along with the West, did want peace and stability, and peacekeeping was a means by which this could be achieved. His letter of instructions states clearly that the Canadians saw the ICC as a way of preventing Laos and Cambodia from falling under communist control.
Canada acted to further American interests from its position on the ICC.
As the conflict intensified in the mids, Canada turned a blind eye towards American arms imports into South Vietnam. The increased military aid which South Vietnam has received since Dec. When Pierre Trudeau came to power in Canada in , he employed a new rhetoric of inde-pendence from American foreign policy.
By , the Americans were totally stalemated in Vietnam, and they were looking for a way out. Canada left a few months later, in July , their final act in the region as part of the Western bloc complete. The UN mission in Cyprus provides another example of Canadian motives concerning peacekeeping. Once again, Canada was motivated by strategic reasons derived from its Cold War alignment. By the s, 80 percent of Cyprus was ethnic Greek, with a sizeable 18 percent minority of ethnic Turks.
This conflict with the British imperial authority culminated in a series of peace talks in In exchange for independence, Cyprus agreed to allow British Sovereign Base Areas SBAs , and guaranteed that neither enosis nor an ethnic partition of the island would occur. After Greek attempts to alter the constitution, severe fighting broke out during the Christmas period in Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios requested British assistance, and both Greece and Turkey threatened to intervene.
On 11 March, Turkey threatened to land troops on the island to protect Turkish Cypriots, while Greece vowed to retaliate if this occurred. The situation in Cyprus was important to Canada because of the strategic situation at the time. The SBAs belonging to Great Britain were used as base sites for both conventional and nuclear weapons.